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Doubt and Indifference: Threshold Conditions 
within the Work of Art
Andrew Benjamin
Abstract. The project of this paper is part of a larger attempt to develop a philosophy 
of art. Integral to that project is the distinction between aesthetics and a philosophy of 
art. It is always possible to consider affect as an end in itself if what is at stake involves 
a series of psychological claims. Equally, it is possible to engage with such claims philo-
sophically. However, there is no clear connection between either possibility and a phi-
losophy of art. In the latter the presentation of affect is always located within images. 
Images are produced by the work of materials. Images have to be understood in terms 
of that production. They have a material presence. If there is a failure to insist on the 
complex materiality of art’s work as comprising a locus of philosophical inquiry, then any 
subsequent theory of the image is unable to contribute to the development of a genu-
ine philosophy of art. Moreover, within the history of art images are informed form. The 
informing of form has two elements. Form is informed firstly by the history in which 
those images are located, and secondly by their capacity to be reworked. The latter can 
be understood as a futural coming-into-relation and thus the possibility that images and 
the elements from which they are comprised are able to have an afterlife. The afterlife is 
forms’ capacity to continue to be informed. It is this latter possibility which necessitates 
that hermeneutic concerns supplant aesthetic ones in the creation of a philosophy of art.
Keywords. Doubt, Indifference, Gesture, Threshold, Deposition, Rosso Fiorentino.
The presence of doubt, uncertainty and indifference, at least at 
the beginning, cannot be differentiated from the realm of feeling. At 
the outset, therefore, they are aesthetic. Descartes for whom doubt 
provided the possibility of a radically new beginning – another 
point of departure for philosophy, this time one grounded in cer-
tainty – had to start with a form of awareness inextricably tied up 
with doubt. The affective has priority insofar as it yields an opening. 
There is an accompanying form of perception. And thus, an aware-
ness, on Descartes part, that he had been deceived. The initial prin-
ciples on which he had based his earlier beliefs were at best uncer-
tain. He had taken «the false for the true (falsa pro veris)» (Adam, 
Tannery [1985]: VII, 17). This perception and its initial connec-
tion to doubt opens the way, for Descartes, to a rethinking of the 
self. Within it the passage from doubt leads to the centrality of the 
subject and with that centrality to the primacy of thinking. Within 
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the movement of the Meditations the possibil-
ity of certainty is then linked to the redescription 
and thus the reconceptualization of the subject as 
that which thinks and thus to a generalised con-
ception of the subject as res cogitans. Nonetheless, 
the point of origination has a different quality. 
Doubt and an accompanying form of awareness 
that is bound to the realm of feeling, and thus to 
the aesthetic, once taken together, identify then 
delimit the point from which the philosophical 
can start. Note Descartes language. In the French 
translation of which he approved he wrote «je me 
suis aperçu», while the original Latin, which is of 
course the opening word of the Meditations prop-
er is Animadverti. Descartes writes in an autobio-
graphical mode; he «noticed». What he «noticed» 
was the presence of the doubtful or the uncertain. 
(Though it should be added that the registration 
of this uncertainty was a feeling, which is inextri-
cably bound up with the presence of doubt). There 
is a founding relation between feeling and doubt. 
Even though that relation does not itself lead to 
certainty and the overcoming of doubt – both 
of which will always have to be methodological 
– nonetheless it prepared the way for that over-
coming. What is important in the context of the 
Meditations is that “noticing” or “remarking” are 
modes of perception. They lead to a situation in 
which doubt will have been overcome. Nonethe-
less, the key point is that as modes of perception 
they have to be radically distinct from the mode 
of perception that will be named by Descartes, by 
the time he reaches Meditation 4, as «clear and 
distinct perception (claram & distinctam percep-
tionem)» (Adam, Tannery [1985]: VII, 61). Per-
ception has two different qualities therefore. In 
the move from one to the other a threshold will 
have been crossed. The significance of doubt in 
this context is that doubt does not just occur at a 
threshold. More is at stake, doubt as originating 
in a feeling also works to constitute the threshold. 
Taken together, feeling and doubt establish what 
might be described as the fleeting primacy of the 
aesthetic.
In sum, both doubt and the feelings and per-
ceptions that occasion doubt as well as mark its 
presence, occur within the domain of the felt 
and thus the realm of experience. At the begin-
ning therefore doubt has an inherently aesthetic 
dimension. And yet, as has been suggested, what 
is constructed is a threshold condition. And it is 
precisely because doubt occurs at the threshold, 
while simultaneously constituting and sustain-
ing the threshold, that doubt cannot remain tied 
to a purely aesthetic occurrence. Even if the aes-
thetic were repositioned such that its equation 
with a form of cognition would allow for claims 
concerning universality (no matter how putative 
such claims may in the end actually be) the aes-
thetic always opens beyond itself. This is the point 
at which it is possible to approach the role of 
the aesthetic within a philosophy of art. Such an 
approach has a certain exigency. It emerges once 
it can be argued that if there were to be a genuine 
philosophy of art for which one possible locus of 
engagement would be the work of figures within 
art’s work, (knowing, of course, that the philoso-
phy of art has greater extension, hence the figure 
is simply one domain of philosophical inquiry 
amongst others), then the presence of a thresh-
old condition would be central because bodies, 
thus figuration which is the movement of bodies, 
have an already present affective dimension that 
occurs at the threshold. The occurrence works 
equally to sustain the threshold. The threshold 
condition however is not the simple coincidence 
of the aesthetic and the ideational (or the concep-
tual). Rather, it is the point at which there is the 
demand that they be thought together. If this were 
taken as the point of departure for a philosophy 
of art, then it follows that such an undertaking 
would be dependent both on the recognition that 
the aesthetic constitutes a threshold condition and 
that thinking art occurs with the necessity of that 
which occurs at the threshold; i.e. thinking is con-
ditioned by the relation between the aesthetic and 
the ideational. A philosophy of art therefore can-
not remain on one side of a threshold. The thresh-
old as constituted by the aesthetic is an opening 
rather than a limitation. The initial difficulties 
inherent in such an undertaking are part of what 
is of concern here.
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There are two positions that arise in this con-
text. Both demand consideration. As a beginning, 
it might be thought, in opposition to the possibil-
ity of the incorporation of the threshold within the 
move from the aesthetic to the philosophy of art, 
that each domain could have been able to function 
as an end in itself. There would then be two posi-
tions to be considered. The first would involve the 
claim that the affective would have been overcome 
completely. From within this purview the affective 
would then be understood as having yielded com-
pletely to thought, a positioning which would lead 
to the effacing of the affective in the name of the 
conceptual. As a result, what this would entail is 
that the threshold, rather than being thought, is in 
fact effaced by the effective removal of an aesthetic 
dimension in the name of the conceptual. The sec-
ond is the converse. A position that involves hold-
ing to the affective – thought, for example, in the 
realm of figuration in terms of the singularity and 
purity of gesture – as the presence of pure self-
expression1. As though what was located on the 
other side of the threshold was pure affect. Then 
there would be a commitment to the expression of 
the affective as though it could be extracted from 
the possibility of its traversal. In the first instance 
the aesthetic remains unthought. In the second, 
there is the refusal to allow for the possibility that 
the aesthetic, understood as incorporating the 
movement of the body, thus the body as expres-
sive, hence the presence of a certain conception of 
gesture, is itself already the site of the ideational. 
In regard to the latter formulation what is exclud-
ed is the possibility that form is always already 
informed; in other words, the claim is that form 
cannot be held apart from either the already pre-
sent registration of the conceptual or the ideation-
al, or their potential registration. The primacy of 
the aesthetic therefore is premised on the exclusion 
of the possibility of the already present informing 
of form. (The broader consequence is, of course, 
that the aesthetic as having priority is a produced 
1 This paper continues and draws on earlier work of mine 
on gesture. See: Benjamin (2016), Benjamin (2017), Ben-
jamin (2019).
state premised on a founding exclusion). Both 
positions, present as a type of either/or, are struc-
tured by exclusions and modes of delimitation.
The exclusions, which are limitations, within 
both of these positions have to be noted. As with 
all limitations, and this despite an intention to 
circumvent thought, they provide openings. The 
project here involves distancing the either/or not-
ed above and then working with the retention of 
the threshold. Working with its retention means 
accepting the presence of the threshold as integral 
to the role of figuration within and as the work of 
art. Figuration, as has already been intimated, is 
the presence of form as always already informed. 
The problem to be investigated here, once the 
threshold is maintained, concerns how the copres-
ence of the affective and the ideational, as a work-
ful presence within works of art, is to be under-
stood. The question has a particular locus of con-
cern. Rather than investigate the question in the 
abstract, as though it could be reduced to a ques-
tion both posed and answered abstractly, it will be 
pursued here by looking at two specific paintings; 
two 16th Century Italian figurative paintings. Both 
are Depositions from the Cross. Each painting 
forms part of an established genre. Each one stag-
es therefore, as the work of art, differing responses 
to the event of Christ’s crucifixion. What is impor-
tant about both is that they open up the possibil-
ity of an engagement with the threshold since they 
both inscribe affective positions within them. In 
addition to lament and mourning, which are both 
direct and emphatic, there is also the presence of 
doubt, uncertainty and indifference. Hence the 
important point is that the event, which as indi-
cated means the Crucifixion as an event, does not 
yield an unanimity of affective responses. Two 
points need to be argued. The first is that the plu-
rality of responses which in the end are both affec-
tive and conceptual define the quality of the Cru-
cifixion as event, while at the same time introduc-
ing the problems that the retention of any singu-
larity as a singularity will always have. (The con-
tention is that this retention is both undone and 
sustained. Unity is both demanded and refused 
demanding thereby a rethinking of what consti-
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tutes an event). The second is that doubt, uncer-
tainty and indifference as responses to the event 
work through the body. The indifferent body, for 
example in the context of a Deposition, acquires 
its force as a result of its relation of non-relation 
to the lamenting bodies or to the bodies who wit-
ness the event. As such, not only is any singular-
ity already relational, singularities acquire mean-
ing within and through those relations. While this 
position is true in principle, and thus accounts for 
the way in which singularities are meaningful, its 
force as a position can only be addressed on the 
level of the singularity itself.
These affective states are incorporated from the 
start into the history of gesture precisely because 
they are modes or instances of the body’s comport-
ment. Doubt and uncertainty, which define the 
stance of bodies and thus are inherently gestural, 
are affective states that take place in relation to 
the Deposition as event. Indifference becomes the 
refusal to allow the event to be present as an event, 
(were the event to be a singularity to which there 
would be a correspondingly singular response). In 
the overall context, doubt, uncertainty and indif-
ference mark and sustain threshold conditions. In 
so doing, they allow for forms of reflection on the 
necessity of the affective; that necessity is gesture’s 
ineliminability within the work of figuration. The 
necessity however is not to be located in the equa-
tion of works of art with affect or the aesthetic but 
with the fact that the affective is itself only possible 
as the marker of a threshold condition. Emerging 
as impossible as a result is any possible evocation 
of the equation of the gesture with pure expres-
sion. What demands consideration in this context 
is how doubt and indifference work as threshold 
conditions within (and as) the work of art.
1.
Both of the paintings under consideration 
are now located in the Pinacoteca in Volterra2. 
2 I want to thank Dr. Alessandro Furiesi, director of the 
Pinacoteca Civica di Volterra for the informations on 
both works.
The first painting is a Deposition by an unknown 
Umbrian-Sienese painter, though it has been 
attributed both to Bartolomeo Neroni and equally 
to an anonymous «seguace del Sodoma»3. [Fig-
ure 1] (Henceforth the Anonymous Deposition). It 
dates from the early 16th Century. The second is 
the famous Deposition by Rosso Fiorentino. [Fig-
ure 2] The latter dates from 1521. Rosso’s painting 
was originally located as an altarpiece in the Cap-
pella della Croce di Giorno which was itself located 
in the Cappella di San Francesco in Volterra, while 
the earlier Deposition was transferred to the Duo-
mo in Volterra from a what is now assumed to be 
an unknown location4. The Anonymous Deposition 
3 Corrado Ricci attributed it to Bartolomeo Neroni. The 
catalogue of the Pinacoteca lists the painting as having 
been done by a «seguace del Sodoma». 
4 For a detailed account of the history and location of 
Rosso’s Deposition see Smith (1976): 67-70.
Figure 1.
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contains few surprises. It is positioned from the 
start within what would be the formal structure of 
a Deposition. In the painting itself there are dif-
fering locales of activity, each with its own affec-
tive dimension. The question that arises concerns 
how the relation between these locales within the 
painting is to be understood. The methodologi-
cal question concerns the possibility of their unity 
and thus the possible conditions under which the 
painting is a unified singularity.
In the Anonymous Deposition Christ’s body is 
being lowered gently from the cross. The figures 
lowering and receiving it are therefore implicated 
in the event. The lamenting female figures, dressed 
as nuns with exception of Mary Magdalen, are 
to the left of the cross. One gazes at the figure of 
Christ; the one whose death has occasioned differ-
ent degrees of lament. Lament opening to mourn-
ing comprises a necessary response; moreover, it is 
one that concedes the humanity of Christ. Christ is 
the figure who is not simply able to die, he dies as 
a human and thus it is a death that can be lament-
ed. He can be mourned. The figures on horses to 
the right of the Cross balance the painting. More 
significantly they function as witnesses to the 
event. Witnessing, here, is an act whose incorpo-
ration within the frame forms part of the event’s 
constitution as an event. There is the inscription of 
spectator as witness. Though as will emerge what 
is equally as significant is what they do not wit-
ness yet which is equally part of the event. What 
this means, of course, is that the event qua event 
cannot be equated directly with what is witnessed. 
(This is of course what the painting’s viewer actu-
ally «witnesses».) The recognition here of both the 
necessity and the limitation of witnessing within 
the frame will further an understanding of, firstly, 
what maintaining the threshold entails and then 
secondly of the complexity inherent in the con-
struction of the event. The final element within 
this particular work, though the one that will be 
central for the analysis to come, is the presence of 
the young man or boy with his hand on the ladder. 
Even though a similar figure is also there in Rosso’s 
painting the difference between them is of funda-
mental significance.
In the Anonymous Deposition the young man 
is positioned within the frame. [Figure 3] Neither 
witnessing nor lamenting, he is equally uninvolved 
in the process of the body’s actual deposition. Nei-
ther witness nor witnessed with the logic of the 
frame, and yet he is there. He stands beneath the 
cross. His hand is on the ladder. His left hand is 
cocked and placed on his hip. However, it is not as 
though his right arm could be exerting any force. 
It is simply placed on the ladder. His weight is tak-
en by his left leg. The right foot is raised; it casts 
a shadow. His leg bends at the knee. The raising 
of the foot and the bend of the knee make it clear 
that the leg is not bearing any weight. Neither the 
Figure 2.
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weight of the cross nor the real or symbolic weight 
of Christ’s body register on his body. His stance is 
other. He strikes a nonchalant pose. He is looking 
neither at Christ nor at any one group of figures. 
He looks across the frame. Neither out of frame 
nor into it. No eye returns his. He is the figure of 
indifference. His eyes – specifically their direction-
ality – are integral part of his presence as indiffer-
ent. The presence occurs at the threshold. While 
his indifference can be noted, noticing cannot be 
separated from the presence of indifference as a 
question: what then is indifference?
Within both of these paintings each group 
is defined by their activity. Witnessing, lament-
ing, engaging the body of Christ (an act in which 
Christ is equally engaged) are all activities. Each 
one has therefore a specific economy. The econ-
omy in question is positioned in relation to what 
has already been identified as the threshold. 
Lament is bodily. Equally, of course, lament is a 
form of affect. Affect and the position of bodies 
are the work of that economy. Taken together they 
create form. The same position can be developed 
in relation to the other groups. In each instance, 
it is possible to identify the presence of affective 
states, a presence held in place by the movement 
and position of bodies. This is, of course, the place 
of gesture. Gesture within paintings of this nature 
comprises the threshold condition. The particular-
ity of the work of art has to be maintained. The 
threshold in Descartes’ Meditations is the point at 
which the affective opened the way to the concep-
tual such that what was significant philosophically 
was the impossibility of restricting that movement. 
Moreover, philosophy then can be understood as 
the passage from affect – the realm of the aesthet-
ic stricto sensu – that incorporates the affective. 
Both obtain. Then taken more generally this claim 
about the philosophical needs to be understood 
as the claim that the threshold at which doubt 
and the affective are at work can never retain the 
affective as an end in itself. Figuration within art 
is art’s presentation of the truth of this proposi-
tion. There is a double movement; affect occasions 
thought, and, affect can be thought. Thinking 
affect is not the elimination of the affective. Rath-
er, it is the recognition that affect is always already 
the site of meaning. Again, this is the opening to 
a reconceptualization of gesture as informed form.
Despite its misleadingly restrictive quality and 
thus its inherently problematic nature the move-
ment of reconceptualization has to start with the 
proposition that gesture might be pure expression. 
Were it to be then it would be expression express-
ing itself. Gesture thus construed would then be 
the locus of the purely affective. Gesture begins 
as the body’s turn. And precisely because it is the 
turn of the body, gestures cannot be equated abso-
lutely with the affective and thus identified with 
the strictly aesthetic; indeed, the contrary is the 
case. What has to be argued is that gesture under-
stood as expression and thus as a form of expres-
sion, gestures as form, is always already informed. 
There is an additional point that has to be made. 
Namely, if affect’s figured presence is form as 
always already informed, it is the informing of 
Figure 3.
129Doubt and Indifference: Threshold Conditions within the Work of Art
form that allows gesture to be expressive. The relat-
ed point is, of course, that the informing of form is 
the affective. (Hence, there cannot be the affective 
as such). As has already been suggested – though 
the analysis integral to its demonstration awaits – 
arguments for the purity of expression, and thus 
arguments for the purely aesthetic, are premised 
upon the refusal of that original informing. And it 
is precisely because what is at stake is gesture that 
what then has to be taken into consideration is 
the relation between gesture and meaning. While 
lamenting, for example, may be an affective state in 
regard to which the interplay of the ideational and 
the affective is clear, the possibility of responding 
to lamentation necessitates a certain form of rec-
ognition; that recognition is an occasioning, one 
held in place by the interplay of the affective and 
the ideational. The lamenting body is informed 
form. The more complex form of presence is how-
ever indifference. Thereby raising the question of 
the status of indifference. The question needs to be 
asked again: what is indifference?
In the Anonymous Deposition, the boy stands 
beneath the cross. While his clothing identi-
fies him as holding a specific position within an 
already established social hierarchy, what matters 
here is his body. How does his body register? Its 
own specific determinations were noted above. 
The body betrays nonchalance. He is indifferent. 
It is not just that nonchalance and indifference 
are contextual, the position is more complex than 
it appears. Indifference has to be located in rela-
tion to that which is taking place around him; 
namely, the differing economies of depositioning 
(Apokathelosis), lamenting, witnessing. While sin-
gular individual figures may have a discernible set 
of particularities, any singularity is already locat-
ed within the economy sustained by that singu-
larity. Moreover, it is not just that economies are 
relational, the painting’s work, in this instance, is 
established by a network of relations. The question 
of what indifference is needs to be posed within 
this exact context. In other words, even the ques-
tion of indifference has to be thought in relation 
to the insistent presence of the threshold. Indif-
ference is not automatically disavowal. Indiffer-
ence might be described as the possible relation of 
non-relation that attends any event. The quality of 
indifference depends upon the demand made by 
the event. Here the Deposition cannot be radically 
disassociated from what is more generally under-
stood as the Passion. As occurrences they create 
a setting in which central to each is, firstly, the 
identification of the insistence of Christ as hav-
ing a specific quality (i.e. human and the son of 
God) and then, secondly, that the event involves 
the actualization of that which has universal force. 
The description of Christ in John 1.14, «the word 
become flesh» (ο λογος σαρξ εγενετο) attests both 
to the necessity of the interplay of universality 
and particularity on the one hand, and the equal 
necessity, on the other, that the interconnection 
of particularity and universality be recognised. 
Namely, that the flesh be recognized not as just 
flesh, which would be the form of flesh, i.e. flesh 
as mere body. Recognition, in both its positive 
and negative dimension, brings form as already 
informed into play. The latter point is essential. 
Integral to the constitution of this occurrence 
as an event is the recognition of its universality. 
What is problematic therefore does not lie in the 
universality but the dependence of that univer-
sality on its being recognised as such; which here 
amounts to informed form having a specific deter-
mination. (This will be the case even if the body 
becomes the locus of conflicting interpretations 
and thus is present as an already plural locus of 
signification). Here, lamenting attests to the suf-
fering while underscoring the quality of the one 
who has suffered; witnessing reinforces the reality 
of the event. Refusal or disavowal would demand 
specific forms of activity. All these positions are 
defined by the event. Indifference, as exemplified 
by the bodily stance of the young man in the first 
of the paintings under consideration, defers hav-
ing to respond.
While the continual registration of defer-
ring creates an opening, the central point is not 
just that its creation is effected by a set of rela-
tions, deferring responding is only explicable in 
terms of those relations. Indifference however 
exerts complex demands. Its complexity resides 
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in the fact that indifference need not be inten-
tional. Rather, the expression of an indifference 
to the event necessitates the presence of a posi-
tion from which what is seen, namely the bod-
ily presence of the young man, be seen as indif-
ference. Seeing him standing beneath the cross 
leaning on a ladder is to encounter indifference. 
There are two possibilities here. Either indiffer-
ence is unintentional; indifference would be pre-
sent then as a form of distraction. Or, there might 
be intentional indifference. If the latter obtained, 
then indifference would be a stand taken in rela-
tion to the event, which could be understood as 
being-indifferent? These two different conceptions 
of indifference should not be seen as suggest-
ing abstract possibilities. They only emerge as a 
result of an observation of the young man’s body. 
The body is present as gestural; almost, as its own 
economy of gestures. The hands, the feet, the dis-
tribution of weight – and details could continue 
to be added – are such that the boy evinces indif-
ference; his stance is nonchalant. The question 
concerning the possibility of the state of being-
indifferent is of great importance since it allows 
for indifference to be understood as an affirmed 
mode of existence. However, what then has to be 
argued is that the attribution of indifference, and 
this will be to allow indifference to be present as a 
form of resistance and thus allow the young man 
to be resisting, though equally it still allows for 
indifference to be no more than an aesthetic dis-
position, are identifications made in relation to the 
location of the boy (the boy, equally, there as his 
body) within a network of relations that are them-
selves structured by the presence of interrelated 
and complex economies. As a result, even if indif-
ference and nonchalance were to be understood 
as modes of existence in which being-indifferent 
as intentional is there as a continual possibility, it 
remains the case that observed indifference, and 
what is observed will retain its ambivalence, is an 
after-effect or relations that position indifference 
at a threshold created by those relations. In other 
words, indifference as a mode of resistance, or as 
the merely aesthetic, acquires the power that it has 
because of the interplay of the ideational and the 
aesthetic; i.e. its power results from the threshold 
condition. Moreover, looking at the young man, 
which has to entail perceiving his body as a locus 
of gestures, means that observing the site of indif-
ference is itself dependent upon recognizing the 
threshold. What is recognized, thus its conditions 
of recognizability, do not just demand the thresh-
old condition, recognition depends upon it. Rec-
ognition is the threshold as an object of thought.
2.
Rosso’s 1521 Deposition warrants a long and 
detailed investigation in its own right. Here, how-
ever attention will be given to what might be tak-
en as two of the marginal figures within the over-
all work. The first is the figure of the young man 
or boy beneath the cross. [Figure 4] The second 
is one of the lamenting women. [Figure 5] A start 
will be made with this woman. She is one of the 
mourners. She laments. She is positioned within 
an overall of economy of lament and mourning. 
However, specifically, she is looking out of the 
frame towards the viewer. What has to be argued 
is that the direction of her look, even the stance of 
her body, fractures the overall economy in which 
she is positioned. This occurs because she cannot 
be located within it if location means complete 
definition. And yet, of course, she is quite liter-
ally located within it. She is lamenting, though 
she is not given over completely to that affec-
tive stance. Neither mourning nor lament com-
plete her. She looks at the viewer. What however 
is the nature of that look? The first thing to note 
is that she too is supporting the Virgin. As such, 
she is initially defined by an economy of lament 
and mourning. She is a part of it. However, while 
she touches others her gaze is elsewhere. Her 
cheeks are red. A colouring held in place, firstly, 
by the line of white along her nose, highlight-
ing it and then secondly the gradual pinkening 
that is the creation of her nostrils. While tears are 
absent she has been crying, however as she looks 
out she is crying no longer. Something else is at 
work. Colour, the effect of colour, is central to the 
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movement of location and dislocation. Her face 
acquires its particularity as a result of the work 
of colour. Colour is part of meaning. Her face is 
there. It is as though her eyes, and the effect of 
her having cried, define her gaze in terms of an 
anxious plea. It is as though she is pleading that 
what has occurred become the event. It has to reg-
ister as what it is. Though, and this is what turns 
her gaze into a plea, her face having become the 
face of doubt, the gesture of doubt, there is the 
accompanying fear that what has occurred might 
not be recognized for what it is. Were it to be a 
mere occurrence, rather than an event, it might 
then slip back into history. And thus, in slip-
ping back, what occurred becomes no more than 
a moment in the passage of historical time. Rec-
ognition, which is the move from occurrence to 
event, would, however, allow it to be lifted out 
of mere time. The latter, namely “mere time”, is 
the identification of historical time with chrono-
logical time. Overcoming that identification of 
time with chronology allows the event to be that 
which announced another time. Her gaze marks 
the presence of the continual threat of the event’s 
disavowal. The problem is clear. Her anxious plea 
grounded. Since the event qua event cannot con-
trol let alone obviate the possibility of disavowal. 
Control will move beyond the singularity of the 
event and then come inscribe itself within the 
complex continuity of the policing of the event. A 
policing whose project is to hold the event apart 
from its presence as just an occurrence; as just 
another crucifixion. Her head turns. She looks out. 
The plea for the event’s recognition, the related 
and ineliminable doubt, knit together the lines of 
possibility noted above. Her face is, of course, the 
threshold condition.
Again, there is a young man next to the lad-
der. He is holding on to the cross; clinging rather 
than leaning. The muscles in his arms are flexed. 
Figure 4. Figure 5.
132 Andrew Benjamin
(Consciously or not will always remain an open 
question.) He is clearly looking at Mary Mag-
dalene. Almost indifferent to the Virgin’s pres-
ence, thus he is indifferent to an economy of 
relations defined by lament and mourning, Mary 
Magdalene holds his attention. In looking at her 
comforting the Virgin, the registration of a uni-
fied economy of lament is, once again, unsettled. 
He seems distracted. Mary Magdalene’s tunic is 
a deep red and while there are obvious symbolic 
reasons for the use of this particular colour, its use 
still leaves open the question as to whether the 
young man was aware of the symbolic dimension 
of the colour. (The symbol’s immediacy is undone 
in advance by the possibility of such a question). 
Could it be that his eyes were diverted by the 
colour alone?5 Was he distracted? His thoughts, 
though not his eyes, would be flitting between her 
presence, the colour of her garments and her place 
kneeling before the Virgin. In other words, what 
he registers, what therefore is registered on his 
face thus what his face presents, his face as ges-
ture, is a state of distraction and thus a founding 
lack of surety. And yet, distraction does not have 
a single or unified single quality. As a result, there 
is an opening in which what endures as a question 
is the extent to which distraction may be a form 
of ambivalence. The possibility of ambivalence is 
a position staged by the painting in terms of the 
physical indifference of his head in relation to his 
body. The turning of the head makes the use of 
the arms almost effortless (though the way they 
are painted indicates that this is not the case since 
muscles flex). In addition, his own lack of engage-
ment in the task undertaken by his arms, leaves 
him free to be distracted. He does not need to 
look in order to hold the ladder. Equally, he can 
look while forgetting or remaining oblivious to the 
fact he is indeed holding the ladder. Distraction 
and ambivalence introduce into what would have 
been a stable economy of mourning and lament-
ing another figure that works to destabilize its 
overall effect. What can be described, more gener-
5 Colour is an important topic in its own right in Rosso’s 
work. See in this regard: Carson (1998): 355-378.
ally, as the boy’s ambivalence, and this is a posi-
tion maintained by his body, once understood 
within the context of the painting as a whole, 
fractures the economy sustained by lament and 
mourning. There is a further point that needs to 
be made concerning the boy’s presence. If the 
space beneath the unity of activity occurring in 
the top half of the painting in which Christ and 
those lowering his body figure was intended to 
have been replicated beneath the cross, then it is 
clear that the ambivalence of the boy undoes that 
possibility or expectation. Both his gaze and his 
body understood as threshold conditions: i.e. as 
the opening in which the affective opens to the 
ideational revealing the already informed nature 
of form. 
The boy’s body as well as his face evince a spe-
cific form of distraction and ambivalence. Ges-
ture has therefore an already present and specific 
determination. The woman who turns and looks 
from the frame, while positioned within a more 
general economy of lament and mourning, equally 
has a specific determination that while related to 
that setting is not, as has been mentioned, defined 
by it. She is pleading. Equally, her face maintains 
a prevailing sense of uncertainty. Her uncertain-
ty is set both within (and against) the certainty 
and unity created by mourning and lamentation. 
The latter comprises an already defined and uni-
fied interplay of location and activity. The boy’s 
ambivalence has to be set, in addition, against 
the activity of Nicodemus and the others as they 
orchestrate the lowering of Christ’s body. There is 
therefore the presence of a complex setting. The 
question pertains to how this complexity is to be 
understood. A lead is given here by the way Nagel 
and Pericolo define a project that is linked to what 
they term the «aporetic». They argue the «goal» 
of an «aporetic methodology» is to understand 
within a «work», what they describe as its «con-
tradictions and non-resolutions» and thus how the 
latter «participate in its identity even as they ren-
der a fixed identity questionable» (Nagel, Pericolo 
[2010]: 10). The project here has been to follow a 
similar trajectory. The presence of the young man 
in the Anonymous Deposition, coupled to the pres-
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ence within Rosso’s Deposition of the boy holding 
the ladder and of the woman who looks beyond 
her location in an economy of lament and mourn-
ing can be understood in terms of the construc-
tion of an aporetic presence. What that means 
here is that each affective state located at, and as, 
a threshold condition. To the extent that such a 
possibility can be maintained – and the project 
here has been to help secure this position – then 
the methodological demands involved the nec-
essary presence of gesture, now the coincidence 
of the movement of the body and meaning, and 
thus never the gesture “as such”. Precluded there-
fore is the reduction of gesture to the presence of 
pure expression. Gesture as part of the threshold 
condition stages the necessary presence of form as 
informed. 
CODA
The project of this paper is part of a larger 
attempt to develop a philosophy of art. Integral 
to that project is the distinction between aesthet-
ics and a philosophy of art. It is always possible to 
consider affect as an end in itself if what is at stake 
involves a series of psychological claims. Equally, 
it is possible to engage with such claims philo-
sophically. However, there is no clear connection 
between either possibility and a philosophy of art. 
In the latter the presentation of affect is always 
located within images. Images are produced by the 
work of materials. Images have to be understood 
in terms of that production. They have a mate-
rial presence. If there is a failure to insist on the 
complex materiality of art’s work as comprising 
a locus of philosophical inquiry, then any subse-
quent theory of the image is unable to contribute 
to the development of a genuine philosophy of 
art. Moreover, within the history of art images are 
informed form. The informing of form has two 
elements. Form is informed firstly by the history 
in which those images are located, and secondly 
by their capacity to be reworked. The latter can be 
understood as a futural coming-into-relation and 
thus the possibility that images and the elements 
from which they are comprised are able to have an 
afterlife.6 The afterlife is forms capacity to contin-
ue to be informed. It is this latter possibility which 
necessitates that hermeneutic concerns supplant 
aesthetic ones in the creation of a philosophy of 
art.
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